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1 I n t r o d u c t i o n
Persuasive texts, such as advertisem ents or public inform ation 
brochures, are written to convince the readers to behave in a cer­
tain m anner, like buying a DVD-player or stop sm oking. These 
texts are generally characterised by pragm atic argum entation, by 
which an action is recom m ended on the basis o f  its favourable 
consequences. In order to enhance the persuasive power o f these 
texts, writers can support their claim s with different types o f  evi­
dence, like statistical inform ation or anecdotes. The text writers’ 
preference for certain types o f  evidence m ight be influenced by 
their cultural background. A  cross-cultural corpus study consist­
ing o f  Dutch and French persuasive brochures will be presented. 
We will first outline our theoretical fram ework by discussing the 
role o f pragmatic argumentation (section two) and evidence types 
(section three) in persuasive com m unication.
2  P r a g m a t i c  a r g u m e n t a t i o n  i n  p e r s u a s i v e  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n
One o f the most used argumentation schem es in persuasive com ­
m unication is pragm atic argum entation. Pragm atic argum enta­
tion is com m only regarded as a subcategory o f  causal argum en­
tation (see, e.g., Perelm an & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 19 6 9 ; G arssen , 
I 997)· The sim plest form  o f pragm atic argum entation looks like
(1) action A  leads to consequence B 
B is (not) desirable 
thus: action A  is (not) desirable
Pragm atic argum entation ‘perm its the evaluation o f an act or an 
event in term s o f  its favorable or unfavorable consequences' 
(Perelman &  Olbrechts-Tyteca, 19 6 9 , 266). There is thus a ‘trans­
fer o f  a given quality from  the consequence to the cause’ (19 6 9 , 
268). Traveling by train, for exam ple, is a good thing, because it 
allows avoiding traffic-jams, or -  an example o f a negative variant
- we should not buy this softw are package, because it w ill raise 
our costs by 24 percent.
Feteris (1997, 2002) has developed an instrum ent for the analy­
sis and evaluation o f pragmatic argumentation. The two m ain crit­
ical questions for the evaluation o f  pragm atic argum entation are 
about the norm ative judgm ent -  B is desirable -  and about the 
empirical judgm ent -  A  leads to B (Feteris, 1997). It seems that, in 
everyday persuasive com munication, the desirability o f the effects 
is only rarely supported by evidence. This goes for public discourse 
(Schellens &  De Jong, 2000), and especially for advertising (Schel- 
lens &  Verhoeven, 1994). In advertising, products and services are 
recomm ended by paying attention to their benefits. In fact, people 
usually buy products to reach a certain goal (see, e.g., Gutm an, 
1982). The desirability o f  these goals -  like freedom , beauty, or 
comfort -  is rarely supported by evidence, because it is self-evident. 
The probability that an action leads to (un)desirable consequences, 
however, is often supported by evidence. I f  a text writer decides to 
support this probability, he can choose from  a large range o f  evi­
dence types, which we will discuss in the section below.
3 Ev i d e n c e  t y p e s  i n  p e r s u a s i v e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n
The concept o f  evidence is best understood by reference to a 
m odel o f  argum entation that has been developed by Toulm in 
(1958). This influential m odel is based on the process o f  argu­
mentation, which can be divided into three stages. The first stage 
is the expression o f a claim. In the second stage, the defender has 
to com e up with data or evidence to support this claim . In the 
third stage, finally, the defender has to show that ‘the step [ from  
the data] to the original claim or conclusion is an appropriate and 
legitim ate one’ (Toulmin, 1958 , 98). This step is called the w ar­
rant, which m eans ‘i f  data, then claim’ . Argum entation schem es 
are characterised by their warrant. The warrant o f  pragm atic 
argumentation, as we have seen, is ‘i f  the consequences are desir­
able, then the cause is desirable too’ . A  warrant can be supported 
by a backing; the relationship between the warrant and its back­
ing is sim ilar to that between the claim  and the data. The schem e 
o f pragm atic argum entation applied to the m odel o f  Toulm in 
(1958), in which both the warrant (probability) and the data (desir­
ability) can be supported, is given in figure 1.
F igu re  i  Desirability and probability in pragmatic argumentation.
I on the basis of |
! probability j
Both the desirability and the probability can be supported by what 
is generally called evidence. There seem s to be an agreem ent in 
the field o f  argum entation and persuasion effects research about 
the m eaning o f evidence, and the different types o f evidence. We 
define evidence as data - fa c t  or opinion -  that is used as an argu­
ment to increase adherence o f  a claim. Evidence types in argum en­
tation studies are usually divided into exam ples (anecdotal evi­
dence), statistics (statistical evidence), and testim ony (source 
evidence). Experim ental studies on the persuasiveness o f  evi­
dence types have also concentrated on these evidence types, and
-  m ore recently (Hoeken, 2 0 0 1)  -  on causal evidence. The dis­
tinction between these four categories is further supported by the 
fact that they are connected to the m ost general argum entation 
schem es (see G arssen, 199 7), and that there is a strong relation 
with research m ethods in social science (see Hoeken &  Hustinx, 
this volume).
In research on evidence types, relatively little attention has been 
paid to the argumentative fram ework in which the concept o f  evi­
dence is situated. Evidence types, however, are strongly related to
claim
action A is desirable
data
consequence B is desirable




action A leads to B
argum ent types. In short, evidence is data, whereas an argum ent 
type is data, w arrant and claim . One type o f  evidence does not 
necessarily bring about one type o f  argum entation schem e. The 
type o f  argum ent depends on the claim , as we will show  in the 
light o f the following exam ple (2) o f anecdotal evidence.
(2) Last Tuesday, when he drove home, Frank called his sister. He 
could not avoid the oncom ing car and got a heavy accident.
This piece o f  evidence can be used to support the general claim  
that using a cell phone while driving is dangerous; the argum ent 
type is that o f  generalisation from  one case to all cases. The sam e 
evidence can be em ployed to add support to a specific claim  that 
John, who often uses his phone in the car, runs the risk  o f an 
accident. The argum ent type then is com parison, in which a cer­
tain case is com pared to a sim ilar another case.
To conclude, by putting evidence in  an argum entative fram e­
work, the relevance o f  argum entation schem es has to be taken 
into account, which -  in turn -  leads to an adaptation o f  the def­
initions o f  evidence types. Table 1 shows the new classification o f 
evidence types that w e will discuss in detail below.
Table 1 Classification oftypes of evidence.
• statistical evidence
• anecdotal evidence with regard to representativeness
• anecdotal evidence with regard to analogy
• causal evidence with regard to prediction
• causal evidence with regard to explanation
• source evidence (can be used alone or in combination with one of the other 
five types)
Statistical evidence is quantitative num erical inform ation about a 
num ber o f  cases. Exam ples o f statistical evidence are '150  0 0 0  
Dutch citizens are depressed', ‘24%  o f the people in this sam ple 
are depressed’ , or 'The risk on a accident doubles with 0.5 gr. o f 
alcohol’ (in the latter case, the num ber o f cases on which this rela­
tionship is based, is not specified).
The m ain  characteristic o f  anecdotal evidence is that it consists 
o f  one or a few  cases, like exam ple (2). A s we have show n above, 
anecdotal evidence can lead to different argum ent types, depend­
ing  on the claim . We therefore m ake the distinction between 
anecdotal evidence with regard to representativeness and anec­
dotal evidence with regard to analogy. Anecdotal evidence with 
regard to representativeness is the presentation o f  one case or a few 
cases that are supposed to be representative o f the group to which 
they belong (generalisation). Anecdotal evidence with regard to anal­
ogy is the presentation o f  one case or a few  cases that are sim ilar 
to another case or a few  other cases1 (comparison).
M ost o f  the classifications in argum entation schem es distin­
guish between prediction -  from  cause to effect -  and explanation
-  from  effect to cause. Causal evidence with regard to prediction 
consists o f one or m ore causes why an event or phenom enon will 
occur. Causal evidence with regard to explanation consists o f  an 
effect that m ust have been caused by one or m ore factors.
The last type o f  evidence w ill be referred to as source evidence, 
factual inform ation or opinions that are stated by a source other 
than the arguer. Source evidence usually does not add new infor­
m ation to support a claim ; it is often a restatem ent o f the claim. 
Source evidence can be used in com bination with the other types 
o f  evidence, like anecdotal or causal evidence, which is com m on 
in everyday persuasive com m unication. Statistical evidence, for 
example, is ‘usually provided by reliable sources’ (Brosius, 2 0 0 0 , 
19). I f  source evidence is m erely a restatem ent o f  a claim , the 
source often is an expert or authority. In argum entation studies 
the definition o f  an authority has always been quite problem atic 
(see, e.g., Walton, 199 7)· We define an expert as ‘an individual or 
group possessing superior knowledge regarding the product class
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[topic, etc.] endorsed. The endorser has obtained this knowledge 
as a result o f  experience, study, or training' (Friedm an &  Fried­
m an, 19 7 9 , 63). We further d istinguish  between six types o f 
sources on two d im ensions. The first d im ension is the author­
ity dim ension: authority -  no authority. The second dim ension -  
identification -  results in  a segm entation o f  increasingly identi­
fied sources: an anonym ous source, a source designated by name, 
and a celebrity. T h is distinction corresponds with early experi­
m ental studies on persuasiveness o f  endorsers.
To sum m arise, there are three m ain groups o f  evidence: 1) 
source evidence alone, 2) source evidence + one o f  the five other 
evidence types, and 3) one o f  the five other evidence types alone. 
Im agine a text that states that older people should be vaccinated 
against the influenza virus, and that provides the positive conse­
quence that those who are vaccinated will not get the influenza. 
The desirability o f  this consequence is not supported, because it 
speaks for itself. The probability that the vaccination does lead to 
the m entioned consequence can be supported by different types 
o f  evidence. The text w riter could for example refer to a success­
fu l study am ong 500 participants (statistical evidence), to a 
researcher o f  a School o f  Medicine that states that vaccinated peo­
ple w ill not get the in fluenza (source evidence, authority), to a 
story o f  an old couple that has successfu lly benefited from  this 
treatment since a few  m onths (anecdotal evidence with regard to 
representativeness), or to the fact that the vaccination consists o f 
ingredients that attack m icrobes that are necessary for the 
influenza to develop (causal evidence with regard to prediction).
4  R e l a t i v e  o c c u r r e n c e  o f  e v i d e n c e  t y p e s  i n  t h e  
N e t h e r l a n d s  a n d  F r a n c e
Som e studies have focused on the relative persuasiveness o f  evi­
dence types (see, e.g., Hoeken, 2 0 0 1), but no attention has been 
paid to the relative occurrence o f  evidence types in real life per­
suasive com m unication. This relative occurrence o f  evidence 
types m ight nevertheless be an indication for the intuition o f  writ­
ers o f  persuasive texts about what types o f  evidence are m ore con­
vincing than others. Moreover, studies on evidence types have 
im plicitly supposed that the relative persuasiveness o f evidence 
types was independent o f  the cultural background o f the subjects 
who judged these evidence types. There are indications, however, 
that the relative persuasiveness and occurrence o f  evidence types 
are influenced by culture. Expert evidence, as a type o f  source evi­
dence, could be used m ore frequently in cultures that are char­
acterised by a h igh power distance between, for example, laym en 
and experts. Pow er distance is one o f  the five d im ensions that 
describe cultural differences (Hofstede, 1980). It is defined as the 
degree to which less pow erful people expect and accept an 
unequal distribution o f power. Claim s o f  experts m ight therefore 
be m ore easily accepted in cultures with a high power distance, 
because o f respect for these experts.
By m eans o f a cross-cultural corpus study, we have investigated 
the relative occurrence o f  evidence types, and especially the cul­
tural influence on this relative occurrence. The study will be dis­
cussed in the sections below, starting with the research questions 
(4.1), the m aterial (4.2), the procedure (4.3), and ending with the 
results (4.4).
4.1 Research questions
As we have just said, the use o f  the different types o f  evidence in 
real life persuasive com m unication m ight give an indication o f 
which evidence types text writers believe to be the m ost persua­
sive. The first research question is thus: what is the relative occur­
rence o f the types o f  evidence in persuasive com m unication? We do 
not have specific expectations about this relative occurrence. 
Schellens and De Jon g (2000) w ere interested in what types o f  
argum ent are used in persuasive inform ation brochures. We can­
not use their results, because 1) their focus was not on quantita­
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tive inform ation about the occurrence o f argum ent types, 2) they 
considered all the argum ent types (and not just those in support 
o f pragm atic argumentation), and 3) an argum ent type is not the 
sam e as an evidence type, as we have explained in section 3.
The second research question is formulated as: is there a cultural 
influence on the relative occurrence o f  evidence types in persuasive 
communication? Culture seem s to play a role in pragm atic argu­
mentation, which is about reasoning (the probability that A  leads 
to B), and about values (the desirability o f B). In fact, cultures dif­
fer in their reasoning processes (see for a review, Nisbett, Peng, 
Choi, and Norenzayan, 2001), and in their preferences for certain 
values (Hofstede, 1980). There is at least one type o f evidence that 
we expect to occur m ore frequently in one culture than in 
another, nam ely expert evidence (the expert as a type o f  source 
evidence). As we have just explained, the occurrence o f expert evi­
dence m ight be related to the degree o f  power distance. In gen­
eral, France has a h igh power distance, whereas H olland is char­
acterised by a relatively low  power distance (Hofstede, 1980 ). We 
therefore hypothesise that the relative occurrence o f  expert evi­
dence in persuasive com m unication is h igher in France than in 
the Netherlands.
4 .2  Material
In order to test a cultural influence on the relative occurrence o f  
evidence types in persuasive com m unication, we have set up a 
cross-cultural corpus study with Dutch and French persuasive 
public inform ation brochures. A dvertisem ents were not taken 
into account, because o f  their lack o f explicit verbal argum enta­
tion in com parison with brochures. The selected brochures had 
to m eet the follow ing conditions: freely available for all citizens, 
and a persuasive character. We will specify these two points below.
During the period October 2 0 0 1  -  May 2 0 0 2  we have collected 
Dutch and French public brochures. In both countries we have 
searched for brochures with direct personal interest for the reader 
(e.g. health), and fundraising brochures with a m ore public inter­
est. The percentage o f fundraising brochures in the final Dutch 
and French corpus is com parable: 4 6 .7 %  for the the form er, 
4 0 .0 %  for the latter.
In Holland, it was quite easy to find these brochures, because 
they are available in all the public libraries and town halls. We 
have found 124  Dutch brochures in the public libraries and town 
halls o f  Am sterdam , D en Bosch, N ijm egen, and Veldhoven. In 
France, public inform ation brochures are m ain ly distributed by 
the instances that publish them; there are only a few  institutions 
that offer a range o f  different brochures. By far the m ost im por­
tant is the French Com m ittee for H ealth Education (le C FES, le 
Comité français d ’éducation pour la santé) that belongs to the 
French Ministry o f  Health. We have contacted several institutions, 
but only the CFES and the Local H ygiene and Health Service (Le 
service communal hygiène et santé) in Rennes have sent a num ber 
o f  brochures. We then contacted 45 French fundraising institu­
tions on the basis o f an online database (www.yeba.org/annuaire), 
and an Internet com pany that groups the m ost im portant French 
fundraising institutions (w w w.aidez.org). In total w e have col­
lected 79 French brochures.
The collected brochures were not all persuasive. The distinction 
between inform ative and persuasive proved to be quite problem ­
atic. From  a theoretical point o f  view, the difference o f  scope is 
clear. The aim  o f informative brochures is to provide inform ation 
to the reader in order to help h im  form  an opinion or m ake a 
decision; the goal o f  persuasive public inform ation is to change 
the reader’s attitude or behaviour in  a direction proposed by the 
text writer (Koelen &  Martijn, 199 4). From  an em pirical point o f 
view, the distinction is often harder to m ake: 1) persuasive 
brochures are often presented in an informative way (as we found 
out in a sm all pre-test with 35 Dutch brochures; see also Schel- 
lens &  De Jong, 2 0 0 0 ), 2) brochures m ay have m ultip le objec­
tives, like in form in g and persuading (De Jong &  Schellens, 
2 0 0 0 ), 3) and Dutch governm ental public inform ation is often 
a com bination o f inform ation and persuasion (Koelen & Martijn, 
199 4). We have found a way out o f  this problem  by using prag­
matic argum entation as the basic structure o f a persuasive infor­
m ation brochure. That is, i f  a brochure presents som e kind o f 
behaviour with its (un)favourable consequences, we consider it 
as a persuasive public inform ation brochure, how informative the 
style m ay seem.
The assum ption that pragm atic argum entation is com m on in 
persuasive public inform ation brochures has proven to be very 
adequate. In the first stage, the initial group o f  collected 
brochures has been divided into inform ative (N = 10 1) and per­
suasive (N = 102) on the basis o f  their content and topic. In  the 
next stage, som e brochures were deleted from  the persuasive 
group: they were still inform ative (e.g., explanation o f  a law), they 
belonged to a uniform  series, or they contained too m uch con­
crete tips (an accent on different actions, and not on their con­
sequences). O nly three o f  the rem ain ing 53 brochures that we 
expected to be persuasive did not provide consequences or 
(dis) advantages o f  the favoured behaviour (5.66%). We can there­
fore conclude that the use o f  pragm atic argum entation as a 
m eans o f  distinction betw een inform ative and persuasive pub­
lic inform ation brochures is successful. A  handful o f  brochures 
even literally refer to the schem e o f  pragm atic argumentation:
(3) ‘C onsidering these disadvantages it is understandable that 
people who do not sm oke them selves, do not want to be 
exposed to passive sm oking either’ (Rookoverlast? U hunt er 
wat aan doen)
This selection process is presented in detail in  table 2 below. 
Finally 30 o f  the 4 0  available Dutch brochures -  published 
between February 19 9 8  and 2 0 0 2  -  and 20  French brochures -  
published betw een 2 0 0 0  and 2 0 0 2  -  have been analysed (see 
appendix for the titles o f  the brochures).
Table 2
Dutch and French informative and persuasive brochures.
country infor- persua- series inf. tips no total rest 
mative sive tips pragmatic
Netherlands 63 61 9 5 5 2 30 10
France 38 41 10 4 6 1 20 0
4.3 Procedure
The 50 persuasive inform ation brochures have been analysed 
with a top-down approach, that is, with a previously determ ined 
perspective, in  this case, pragm atic argum entation. The proce­
dure consists o f  three stages: 1) determ ining the intended behav­
iour, 2) searching for the (un)favourable consequences or the 
advantages and disadvantages, 3) seeking evidence in support o f 
the probability2 that the behaviour leads to the consequences. We 
have deliberately noted down consequences and (dis) advantages 
in the second stage. As we have seen in section 2, pragmatic argu­
m entation is a subcategory o f  causal argum entation in  a sense 
that an action (cause) will lead to a favoured consequence. In per­
suasive texts, however, consequences are som etimes presented as 
advantages (attributes o f  an object). Exam ple (4) is straightfor­
ward: buying the 307 SW  will lead to a favourable consequence.
(4) buy the Peugeot 307 SW  consequence: you can take with 
you lots o f  luggage
(5) buy the Peugeot 307 SW  advantage: lots o f  luggage space 
Example (5) is sem antically identical, but there is one difference.
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The action does not lead to the car having lots o f  luggage space. 
There is no favourable consequence, but a favourable attribute o f 
the object. A lthough this is still argum entation on the basis o f 
advantages, w e see that there is no direct causal component. The 
reader has to in fer from  (5) that he w ill be able to take with him  
lots o f  luggage (4). W hat is the consequence for the concept o f 
evidence? W hen argum ents in the brochures are presented like
(5), evidence can support the claim  that an object has a certain 
characteristic, but not that an action leads to a consequence.
Only verbal argum ents were taken into account in the analysis, 
and not visual argum ents, such as an im age o f  a person. Q ues­
tions whether that person can be linked to certain statements in 
the evidence or the claim  or not, are then hard to answer.
After an agreem ent between three persons about the exact pro­
cedure, the 50 brochures (that contained in total 127  pieces o f evi­
dence) have been analysed by one person on two occasions (the 
second analysis has only produced four m odifications). Then 14 
doubtful cases have been discussed by the three persons, which 
has led to only three changes. All cases o f  support o f  the conse­
quences’ probability have been counted; the total num ber o f cases 
o f  evidence in a brochure varied from  zero to ten (M = 2.54, sd 
= 2.43). The relative occurrence o f  an evidence type was counted 
by divid ing the total num ber o f  occurrences o f  that type in all 
brochures by the overall num ber o f evidence instantiations.
4 .4  Results
The corpus study has been conducted to indicate the relative 
occurrence o f  evidence types in persuasive brochures, and to 
determ ine whether this occurrence is culture-dependent. In the 
discussion about the results below, we will -  unless necessary -  
concentrate on the four traditional types o f evidence: statistical, 
anecdotal, causal, and expert evidence^.
Table 3 Relative occurrence of evidence types in the Dutch and French
brochures.
evidence type Dutch French total
anecdotal 27.27* 32.79 29.92
statistical 16.67 42.62 29.13
causal 43.94 14.75 29.92
expert 9.09 21.31 14.96
'"Percentages may exceed 100%, because cases that combine expert evidence with 
another type of evidence are counted in both categories; it is also possible that 
percentages do not sum up to 100%, because instantiations of source evidence in 
which the source is not an expert are counted in the total, but are not presented 
in this table.
The first research question was about the relative occurrence o f  
the types o f  evidence in persuasive public information brochures. 
W hen the Dutch and French brochures are taken together, the 
four types o f evidence are not equally present ((2 = 30 .6 1, d f = 2, 
p < .00 1). M ore specifically, statistical, anecdotal, and causal evi­
dence are all three m ore frequent than expert evidence (all (2 
above 4.45, and p < .05). In the Dutch brochures, the four types 
o f  evidence are not equally present ((2 = 2 8 .16 , d f  = 3, p < .001). 
Causal evidence is the m ost frequent type o f evidence; anecdotal 
evidence is m ore frequently used than expert evidence, whereas 
statistical evidence is m idw ay between anecdotal and expert evi­
dence. In the French corpus, the distribution o f  the types o f evi­
dence is unequal too ((2 = 17 .2 1, d f  = 3, p < .00 1): statistical and 
anecdotal are the m ost used  types o f  evidence, and expert evi­
dence and causal evidence the least used.
The influence o f  culture on the relative occurrence o f  these evi­
dence types com es up in the second research question. A s can be 
seen by com paring the second and third colum n in  table 3, the
relative occurrence o f  the four types o f evidence is different in the 
N etherlands than in France, and thus culture-dependent ((2 = 
30 .0 0 , d f = 3 , p < . o o i ) .  We w ill now  specify this cultural differ­
ence by discussing the relative occurrence o f the four types o f  evi­
dence. In the first place, our hypothesis was that expert evidence 
is m ore frequently used in France than in the N etherlands 
because o f  a difference in power distance. This is confirm ed, not 
only quantitatively ((2 = 5.00, d f  = 1, p < .05), but qualitatively as 
well: 1 1  o f the 13 French cases o f expert evidence were experts des­
ignated by nam e, w hereas only 2 o f  the 6 Dutch experts were 
indicated by nam e; see exam ple (6). A n  exam ple o f  expert evi­
dence with anonym ous experts is given in  (7):
(6) A ccordin g to the Academ y o f  H ealth Sciences, cigarette 
sm oke is ‘the m ost im portant source o f  dom estic air pollu­
tion’ ...’ (Le tahagism e passifj
(7) ‘ Studies dem onstrate it: those who eat lots o f  fru it and veg­
etables, have a lower risk  to get cancer...’ (G eefkan ker m inder 
kans, eet volop groente en fruit)
Although expert evidence is m ore frequent in the French 
brochures than in  the Dutch, there is no difference in the occur­
rence o f  source evidence, w hether without or in  com bination 
with other types o f  evidence ((2 =  .71, d f  = 1, p < .80). The use o f 
sources (ordinary people, experts, etc.) is thus equal in both cor­
pora, but experts are m ore employed in the French corpus.
Statistical evidence, in the second place, is more frequent in the 
French brochures ((2 = 11.58, d f  = 1, p < .001); not only statistical 
evidence without source evidence ((2 = 6.85, d f  = 1, p < .01), but 
statistical evidence in com bination with source evidence as well 
((2 = 4 .74, d f  = 1, p < .05). In  the third place, causal4 evidence 
occurs m ore in Dutch brochures than in French brochures ((2 = 
14 .26 , d f =  1, p < .001). In the fourth place, anecdotal5 evidence is 
as frequent in the Dutch as in the French corpus ((2 = .51, d f  = 1, p
< .50). There is nevertheless a remarkable difference in anecdotal 
evidence with or without source evidence. A n anecdote in com bi­
nation with source evidence is m ore used in the Dutch corpus ((2 
= 5.03, d f  = 1, p < .05), and anecdotes without a source are far more 
employed in the French brochures ((2 = 12 .66 , d f = 1, p < .001). An 
example o f the form er is (8) and an example o f the latter is (9):
(8) ‘Nelly (55) is a volunteer. “ It started about 10  years ago. I 
m oved to a flat, and terribly m issed m y garden (H anden  
uit de mouwen voor de natuur)
(9) ‘Abdoulaye (3 years old) weighs 5.5 kilos, the weight o f  an aver­
age 4  years old child in France. Two nutritionists [...] take 
charge o f  h im  and his m other in Chad (La fa im  c’est quoti- 
dien)
The difference between these exam ples lies in the perspective: in 
(8) a person gives the anecdotal inform ation him self, and in (9) 
the inform ation is presented by the text writer6.
5 C o n c l u s i o n  a n d  d i s c u s s i o n
The persuasiveness o f  texts, in  which an action is recom m ended 
(or advised against) on the basis o f its positive (or negative) con­
sequences, can be increased by providing evidence that the action 
does really lead to the consequences and that the consequences 
are indeed (un) desirable. The occurrence o f  evidence types in 
everyday com m unication m ight be an indication for the intuition 
o f  text writers about which types o f  evidence are m ore convinc­
ing. The claim  that the relative occurrence o f  evidence types is 
influenced by culture, is supported by a corpus study, which con­
sisted o f  30 Dutch and 20  French persuasive public inform ation 
brochures. Expert evidence was m ore frequent in the corpus o f  
France, a country that scores h igh on power distance com pared 
to the Netherlands. Besides this difference, there are also differ­
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ences in the relative occurrence o f  evidence types that we cannot 
explain on the basis o f  values (Hofstede, 19 8 0 ): statistical evi­
dence, and anecdotal evidence without source evidence were 
m ore frequent in the French corpus; causal evidence, and anec­
dotal evidence in com bination with source evidence occurred 
m ore in the Dutch brochures.
Although this corpus research seem s to indicate that the rela­
tive occurrence o f  evidence types is culture-dependent, three 
methodological rem arks have to be made. In the first place, when 
counting the use o f  different types o f  evidence, we assum e that 
text writers are able to m ake a choice in favour o f  a certain type o f 
evidence, whether consciously or not. T his m eans that, in the 
ideal situation, all possible evidence types are appropriate. One 
m ay question, however, whether all types o f  evidence are always 
equally available and appropriate. Taking into account a large 
num ber o f brochures can partly solve this problem. The num ber 
o f brochures that have been involved in this corpus study is not 
extremely high, but we have explained the reasons for that in sec­
tion 4.2 (see also table 2). Not only the num ber o f brochures, but 
the total num ber o f  cases o f  evidence as well is a solution to the 
problem  m entioned above. The num ber o f  evidence instantia­
tions for the probability that actions w ill lead to certain conse­
quences is 127, a considerable num ber to draw conclusions upon. 
This leads to a second rem ark, nam ely about the way the relative 
occurrence o f  evidence types is counted. In addition to the pro­
cedure we have selected -  considering all cases o f  evidence that 
were present in the corpus -  one could also opt for a m ore con­
servative one. In that procedure, differences between brochures 
in the num ber o f cases o f evidence are reduced by neglecting the 
num ber o f cases for one type o f evidence in a brochure. Essential 
is whether the type o f  evidence occurs, and not the num ber o f  
occurrences. W hen, for exam ple, causal evidence occurs three 
times in one brochure, it is only indicated that causal evidence is
present in that brochure. Since choosing this procedure would 
im ply a reduction o f  cases o f evidence from  12 7  to 58, we have 
opted for the other m ethod7. The third and last rem ark is about 
the reliability. A s we have indicated in  section 4.3, the 50 
brochures have been analysed by one single person. Although 
there are indications that the analysis is quite reliable (the second 
analysis, for exam ple, has only produced four m odifications), it 
has to be done again by other persons.
Besides a new  analysis with a few  m ore brochures and other 
judges, we have another suggestion for further research. The type 
o f  interest in the brochures m ight be an interesting factor to 
explore. One can distinguish between brochures with direct per­
sonal interest for the reader (e.g. health), and brochures with a 
public interest (e.g. Am nesty International). As Schellens and De 
Jon g (2000) indicate, an appeal on rules or principles to judge 
the desirability o f  the consequence o f an action can be expected 
in brochures w ith an idealistic and / or collective interest. In 
these brochures, the desirability o f  the consequences is not 
directly speaking for itse lf for the reader. Public inform ation 
brochures that are written with a public interest m ight thus want 
to support the desirability o f  the consequence o f  the proposed 
action. This corpus study does in fact confirm  this: evidence to 
support the desirability o f the consequences is m ore frequent in 
brochures with a public interest than in brochures with a direct 
personal interest ((2 = 5.15, d f  =  1, p < .05). As both types o f 
brochures differ in the occurrence o f support for the desirability 
o f  consequences, they m ay also differ in  the relative frequency 
with which evidence types are used to support the probability that 
an action leads to (un)favourable consequences. The distinction 
between brochures with a public or a personal interest m ight 
thus lead to a better insight into the relative occurrence o f  evi­
dence types in persuasive com m unication, and into the cultural 
influence on this relative occurrence.
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has traditionally been divided into 
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cases being compared belong to 
the same class), and figural anal­
ogy (A is to B as C is to D). Fig­
ural analogy is not taken into 
account is this study, because its 
use in persuasive communication 
is supposed to be very limited.
2 In the rest of this paper we will 
only discuss evidence in support 
o f probability, and not o f desir­
ability. The (un) desirability o f the 
consequences or of the current 
situation was only supported in 
36.00% of the brochures, and -  
moreover -  the total number of 
cases of evidence in support of 
the desirability was only 40.
3 The eleven types of evidence (see 
section 3) have been regrouped in 
this way: 1) statistical evidence 
with and without source evi­
dence, 2) anecdotal evidence with 
regard to representativeness / 
analogy, with and without source 
evidence, 3) causal evidence with 
regard to prediction / explana­
tion, with and without source evi­
dence, and 4) expert evidence (an 
expert as source evidence), with
and without another type of evi­
dence. Statistical information 
given by an expert in a brochure is 
thus counted as statistical evi­
dence, and as expert evidence at 
the same time.
4 In none of the brochures causal 
evidence by explanation occurred. 
This is understandable, because in 
order to support the probability 
that an action will lead to certain 
consequences, one has to provide 
causes why these consequences 
will occur (causal evidence by pre­
diction).
5 Anecdotal evidence with regard to 
analogy did not occur in the cor­
pus, probably because of the gen­
eral claims that are usually 
employed in public information 
(‘People that drink have a higher 
risk to get involved in a car acci­
dent’), leading to anecdotal evi­
dence with regard to representa­
tiveness. A specific claim 
(‘William, who drinks, has a 
higher risk to get involved in a car 
accident’) would bring about an 
analogy.
6 This distinction seems to be 
important for the persuasiveness 
o f evidence types, since Gibson
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and Zillmann (1998) have shown 
in their experiment that citation in 
an anecdote is more convincing 
than just paraphrasing in an anec­
dote.
7 We have also carried out the 
same analysis with the conser­
vative procedure, in which 7 of 
the 16 (2-tests lead to another 
result.
A p p e n d i x
Dutch brochures
Amsterdam heeft wat met Managua (s.d.)
De ervaring van je leven (s.d.)
De o is weer in de maand: tijd voor de griepprik! (July 2001)
Fietsersbond voor fietsers die meer willen (s.d.)
Geef een kind als Joli een betere toekomst! (s.d.)
Geef kanker minder kans eet volop groente en fruit (autumn 2000)
Geef om dit kind (s.d.)
Handen uit de mouwen voor de natuur (2001)
Heerlijk smullen! (s.d.)
Het kindje links is de moeder (s.d.)
Het leven is hart... zorg er goed voor (s.d.)
Hou de spanning erin ... (s.d.)
Ik zoek een huis waar ik voor donker binnen moet zijn (February 1998)
In Nederland bent u vrij om lid te worden van Amnesty International (2001) 
Klein chemisch afval bij u thuis (December 2000)
Max Havelaar meer dan lekker (October 1998)
Mist, halveer je snelheid, verdubbel je afstand (s.d.)
Nederlanders naar Srebrenica (February 2001)
Omdat u als klant in geldzaken lang niet vanzelf koning(in) bent (s.d.)
Over gewicht (June 1999)
Pas bij nul houden we op met tellen (s.d.)
Reuma? Kom maar op! (s.d.)
Rookoverlast? U kunt er wat aan doen (s.d.)
‘Sport’vissen is niet zo sportief... (s.d.)
Tabak (December 1998)
Teken van geweld (2002)
Veilig internetten (October 2001)
Wat doet drank met u? (September 2000)
Wel eens een vluchteling de weg gewezen? (s.d.)
Zuivere koffie (s.d.)
French brochures
Accro à la musique, pas à la drogue! (s.d.)
Alcool, savoir plus risquer moins (February 2001)
Amnesty, comment ça marche? (s.d.)
Avec vous le défi de la solidarité (October 2001)
Baleines et dauphins en liberté avec SOS Grand Bleu (s.d.)
Écoute cancer (January 2002)
Et vous, avec l’alcool, vous en êtes où? (s.d.)
Femmes et tabac (s.d.)
Guide pratique pour faire le point sur votre consommation d’alcool (s.d.) 
Hépatite C et usage de drogues (August 2001)
La faim c’est quotidien (s.d.)
Le dépistage, dès qu’il y a un doute ... (June 2001)
Le tabagisme passif (s.d.)
Legs et donations en faveur du CCFD (s.d.)
Les premières fois (s.d.)
Œuvrer ensemble à l’éducation des orphelins de la Police (2002)
On ne peut par dire qu’on ne peut rien faire (s.d.)
Protection rapprochée roller (s.d.)
Quand je serai grande, j’inventerai un vaccin contre la vitesse (2000)
Si chacun fait un peu, c’est la vie qui gagne (s.d.)
